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Somalia, from 1991 to 2006, is cited as a real-world example of a stateless society and legal system.〔 〕 Since the fall of Siad Barre's government in January 1991, there had been no central government in Somalia〔 until the establishment of the Transitional National Government and its successor the Transitional Federal Government. Large areas of the country such as Puntland, Somaliland and Galmudug were internationally unrecognized and administered as autonomous regions of Somalia. The remaining areas, including the capital Mogadishu, were divided into smaller territories ruled by competing faction leaders. In many areas, there were no formal regulations or licensing requirements for businesses and individuals. The Transitional Federal Government, formed in 2004, was recognized as the central government of Somalia. Before December 2006, the TFG controlled only the town of Baidoa, the sixth largest city.〔(【引用サイトリンク】title=Somalia )〕 The intervention of Ethiopian government forces following the rise of the Islamic Courts Union, culminating in the latter's defeat in the Battle of Baidoa, allowed the TFG to expand its control under the protection of Ethopian troops. The TFG was at the time not able to effectively collect taxes, had no notable finances or real power base,〔 and struggled to exert control over Mogadishu following an attempted move in late December 2006.〔 However, the TFG later succeeded in capturing most of Somalia from insurgents, but struggled to cement its control and establish law and order. Benjamin Powell argued that statelessness led to more order and less chaos than had the previous state,〔 and economist Alex Tabarrok claimed that Somalia in its stateless period provided a "unique test of the theory of anarchy", in some aspects near of that espoused by anarcho-capitalists David D. Friedman and Murray Rothbard, although this is disputed by various anarchists, of both the capitalist and anti-capitalist varieties, who contend it is not anarchy, but merely chaos,〔 〕 perhaps resulting from unequal distribution of power and meddling by neighbors and developed nations like the United States. The Somali experience since the collapse of the state, and especially the failure of international intervention, has offered a clear challenge to elements of conventional economic, political and social order theory and the very premises under which Western diplomacy and development agencies operate,〔 and in particular, in the words of anthropologist Peter D. Little, "assumptions about the role of states in maintaining order and services".〔Little, P. (2003). ''Somalia: Economy without state''. Oxford:International African Institute in association with James Currey.〕 ==The rule of law== Following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime, there was effectively no formal monocentric government law in Somalia. While some urban areas such as Mogadishu had private police forces, many Somalis simply returned to the traditional clan-based legal structures for local governance and dispute resolution.〔 Identified by ''The New York Times'' as "legendary individualists",〔 Somalis have been thought of as particularly conducive to anarchist forms of social organisation; social scientists have identified the pastoralist way of life that a great many Somalis lead as in tension with formal statist legal systems.〔Mazrui, A. (1997). "Crisis in Somalia: From tyranny to anarchy." In Adam, H. & Ford, R. (Eds.), ''Mending rips in the sky: Options for Somali communities in the 21st century'' (pp. 5–11). Lawrenceville, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, Inc.〕 Political loyalties are based on clan and region rather than political party, which, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs makes the sustainability of a centralised political system "difficult".〔 Anthropologist Spencer MacCallum has identified the rule of law during the period as that of the Xeer, a customary law indigenous to Somalia. The law permits practices such as safe travel, trade, and marriage, which survives "to a significant degree" throughout Somalia, particularly in rural Somalia where it is "virtually unaffected".〔 MacCallum credits the Xeer with "Somalia's success without a central government, since it provides an authentic rule of law to support trade and economic development."〔 In the Xeer, law and crime are defined in terms of property rights; consequently the criminal justice system is compensatory rather than the punitive system of the majority of states, and the Xeer is "unequivocal in its opposition" to any form of taxation. Powell et al. (2006) find that the existence of the common law dispute resolution system in Somalia makes possible basic economic order. MacCallum compares the Xeer to the common law in 6th century Scotland, and notes that there is no monopoly of either police nor judicial services,〔 a condition of polycentric law. However, a weakness of such a system is that it proves ineffective at handling disputes and enforcing resolutions that cross clan boundaries. For example in a dispute involving telecommunications company Aerolite, the plaintiff from the weaker clan was unable to collect the "unfairly" small settlement they had been awarded.〔 The absence of any effective coast guard to enforce maritime law has resulted in Somalian international waters becoming an "international free-for-all", with piracy off the coast of Somalia in particular being the subject of international attention. Supporters of Somali piracy argue that they are reacting to illegal overfishing and toxic waste dumping by foreign powers, and some pirate organisations have styled themselves as voluntarist defense organisations with names like National Volunteer Coastguard of Somalia and Somali Marines. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「History of Somalia (1991–2006)」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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